Yes, generally it is **more protective in principle**, though sometimes less efficient in practice.
- The rationale was governance legitimacy:
- an **LPAC is a small subset** of LPs
- LPAC members may themselves be **conflicted**
- LPAC members typically owe **no fiduciary duty**
- a **Majority in Interest of LPs** better reflects the fund’s actual economic owners
For a fund with only **1 to 2 LPAC members**, broader LP approval can be more protective because it avoids a tiny group effectively binding everyone else.
Your tradeoff point is right:
- **more protection / legitimacy**
- but also **more burden on LPs** and slower process
So it mostly shifts material conflict decisions to a broader consent standard, especially for **fund-wide conflicts**.
References:
-
https://decilehub.com/base/1-general_questions/163514-why-did-v3-0-move-conflict-of-interest-approval-from-the-advisory-committee-to-a-majority-in-interest-of-lps
- https://decilehub.com/base/1-general_questions/163750-why-does-the-advisory-committee-owe-no-fiduciary-duty
